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Can BLM Get to Net-Zero Emissions for Fossil Fuel 
Development? A Proposed Road Map 
 
Jamie Gibbs Pleune, John C. Ruple, and Nada Wolff Culver 
 
 “Let me be very clear today . . . The world does have a carbon budget. It’s 
finite and it’s running out fast, and we need a rapid transition to net-zero.”1 The 
chief executive officer of BP, Bernard Looney, might be an unexpected climate 
spokesman, but his statement reflects scientific consensus. In 2019, the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) issued a special report 
emphasizing the importance of limiting global warming to 1.5°C.2 Limiting global 
warming requires adhering to a carbon budget that is being depleted as time passes.3 
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1 Robert Perkins, BP Sets Target for “Net Zero” Carbon Footprint by 2050, PLATTS OILGRAM 
NEWS, Feb. 13, 2020. 
2 Summary for Policymakers, in GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C. AN IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON THE 
IMPACTS OF GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C ABOVE PRE-INDUSTRIAL LEVELS AND RELATED GLOBAL 
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION PATHWAYS, IN THE CONTEXT OF STRENGTHENING THE GLOBAL 
RESPONSE TO THE THREAT OF CLIMATE CHANGE, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, AND EFFORTS TO 
ERADICATE POVERTY (Valérie Masson-Delmotte et al. eds., IPCC 2018) [hereinafter IPCC 
Summary for Policymakers]. 
3 Id. at 12, para. C.1.3. 
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For this reason, the World Economic Forum’s Global Risks Report identified 
“‘[f]ailure of climate change mitigation and adaptation’ [as] the number one risk by 
impact and the number two by likelihood over the next ten years.”4  
Regarding fossil fuel development on federal lands, the Bureau of Land 
Management (BLM) sits amidst a myriad of tensions that pull at the fabric of a 
carbon budget.5 Almost one quarter of all U.S. carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions 
come from fossil fuels extracted from public lands.6 Although BLM has 
acknowledged climate change risks in the past, under the Trump Administration, 
the agency has rolled back methane reduction strategies,7 encouraged coal leasing,8 
and expedited fossil fuel production on federal land.9 Even before these rollbacks 
 
4 WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, THE GLOBAL RISKS REPORT 2020, at 12, 34 (2020), available at 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Global_Risk_Report_2020.pdf. 
5 Recognizing that there are multiple types of greenhouse gases (GHGs) with differing properties, 
this Article generally refers to GHG emissions as a whole, without distinguishing between the 
different gases. However, where a specific statistic or reference identifies a particular gas or refers 
to carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e), the specificity is reflected in this Article. For more information 
about the different properties of GHGs and for a definition of CO2e, see U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Overview of Greenhouse Gases, 
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/overview-greenhouse-gases (last updated May 28, 2020). 
6 U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, FEDERAL LANDS GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SEQUESTRATION 
IN THE UNITED STATES: ESTIMATES FOR 2005-14, at 1, 8 (2018), available at 
https://pubs.usgs.gov/sir/2018/5131/sir20185131.pdf. This number includes upstream (extraction-
based) and downstream (user-based) emissions. 
7 See Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation; Rescission or 
Revision of Certain Requirements, 43 C.F.R. §pt. 3160 (2018), 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2018-09-28/pdf/2018-20689.pdf (announcing rescission 
of Obama-era rule that clarified BLM’s authority to set royalty rates at or above 12.5%). 
8 Exec. Order No. 13783, Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth, 82 Fed. Reg. 
16093 (Mar. 31, 2017) [hereinafter E.O. 13783] (rescinding Executive Orders and Plans related to 
responding to climate change and instructing all agencies to “suspend, revise, or rescind” agency 
actions arising from instructions related to addressing climate change); Exec. Order No. 13868, 
Promoting Energy Infrastructure and Economic Growth, 84 Fed. Reg. 15495 (Apr. 10, 2019); 
Secretarial Order No. 3348, Concerning the Federal Coal Moratorium (Mar. 29, 2017).  
9 See, e.g., E.O. 13783, supra note 8. 
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were implemented, the United States was not on track to reach the carbon budget 
targets that it had submitted to the United Nations.10  
Regardless of the Trump Administration’s hostility to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change,11 BLM has a statutory duty set forth 
in the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) to coordinate 
management of various resources “without permanent impairment of the 
productivity of the land and the quality of the environment.”12 Continuing to permit 
fossil fuel development without adhering to a carbon budget violates this statutory 
duty. 
Until there is a federal carbon budget in place ensuring that increased 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from federal leases will not exacerbate climate 
change, BLM should not authorize an increase in GHG emissions. Instead, BLM 
should use its broad regulatory authority over federal mineral leases to impose a 
net-zero obligation on all new development activity, including new wells on 
existing leases. Requiring net-zero emissions from all new fossil fuel development 
activity would be one way to create a predictable and transparent method of 
balancing the interests of current lease holders with the necessity of adhering to a 
 
10 UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2019, at 20 (2019), 
available at  
https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/30797/EGR2019.pdf?sequence=1&isAllo
wed=y (noting that the U.S. target emission reductions were 26%-28% from 2005 levels by 2025 
and expressing concern that the Trump Administration has reduced anticipated emission reductions 
from power plants and frozen requirements for GHG reductions in vehicle emissions and fuel 
economy standards, in addition to encouraging increased fossil fuel production on public land); see 
id. at 26 (explaining that “continuation of current global policies would lead to a global mean 
temperature rise of 3.5°C by 2100” with a range of 3.4°C to 3.9°C and a 66% probability). 
11 Lisa Friedman, Trump Serves Notice to Quit Paris Climate Agreement, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2019. 
12 42 U.S.C. §1702(c). 
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science-based carbon budget. The existing legal framework provides a method of 
implementing this budgetary restriction in a fair, transparent, justifiable, and 
efficient manner. Using the permitting process to require mitigation of GHG 
emissions would align with BLM’s statutory duties and strike a more appropriate 
balance of resource uses to meet “the present and future needs of the American 
people.”13  
This Article is a summary of a longer, more detailed forthcoming 
exploration of BLM’s statutory responsibility and authority to mitigate GHG 
emissions from fossil fuel production, focusing on oil and gas leasing for context. 
It argues that BLM must address climate change in its decisions. It also proposes a 
legal strategy for BLM to require that all new oil and gas wells, including those on 
existing leases, achieve net-zero GHG emissions (for upstream and downstream 
emissions) as a condition of operational approval. While the following discussion 
focuses on the oil and gas permitting process, the same principles could apply to 
other permitting decisions.  
I. There Is Scientific Consensus About the Urgency of Reducing GHG 
Emissions  
 Climate change is happening;14 it is worse than we expected;15 and it will 
 
13 Id. (defining “multiple use” to include “management of the public lands and their various resource 
values so that they are utilized in the combination that will best meet the present and future needs 
of the American people”). 
14 1 U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, CLIMATE SCIENCE SPECIAL REPORT: FOURTH 
NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 36 (2017), available at 
https://science2017.globalchange.gov/downloads/CSSR2017_FullReport.pdf (summarizing 
“thousands of studies conducted by tens of thousands of scientists” to conclude that “evidence of a 
changing climate abounds from the top of the atmosphere to the depths of the oceans”). 
15 WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, supra note 4, at 33 (reporting that climate change is “striking harder 
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get even worse if we fail to act decisively.16 These facts prompted the IPCC to issue 
a special report emphasizing the importance of limiting global warming to 1.5°C.17 
Summarizing the best available science, the IPCC recognizes that human activities 
have already caused 1°C of global warming, and will likely reach 1.5°C within the 
next few decades.18 On the current global emissions trajectory, warming will reach 
at least 3°C by the end of the century.19 Allowing global warming to exceed 1.5°C 
will likely cause irreversible harm to planetary functions that support ecosystems, 
biodiversity, and human civilizations.20 
Increasing the atmospheric concentration of CO2 (and other heat-trapping 
gases, like methane) caused this rise in temperature.21 Between 1958 and 2019, the 
average annual CO2 concentration skyrocketed from 315 parts per million (ppm) to 
more than 400 ppm.22 According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the 
concentration of CO2 has increased 46% from pre-industrial levels, and the 
concentration of methane has increased 165% during this time.23 Continuing to 
 
and more rapidly than many expected”). 
16 See generally IPCC Summary for Policymakers, supra note 2.  
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 4, para. A.1. 
19 UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 10, at 27. 
20 IPCC Summary for Policymakers, supra note 2, at 5, para. A.3.1. 
21 Executive Summary, in INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS 1990-2018, 
at ES-1, ES-2 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2020) [hereinafter EPA Executive Summary], 
available at https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2020-04/documents/us-ghg-inventory-
2020-chapter-executive-summary.pdf. 
22 Global Carbon Dioxide Growth in 2018 Reached 4th Highest on Record, NAT’L OCEANIC & 
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., Mar. 22, 2019, https://www.noaa.gov/news/global-carbon-dioxide-growth-
in-2018-reached-4th-highest-on-record; CO2 at NOAA’s Mauna Loa Observatory Reaches New 
Milestone: Tops 400 ppm, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. GLOBAL MONITORING 
DIVISION, May 10, 2013, https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/news/7074.html (reporting milestone of 
exceeding daily mean of 400 ppm). 
23 EPA Executive Summary, supra note 22, at ES-2. 
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increase GHG emissions will further degrade atmospheric composition and 
exacerbate climate change. A global pathway, with no or limited overshoot of 
1.5°C, would require a 45% decline in global anthropogenic GHG emissions by 
2030, reaching net zero around 2050.24 “This equates to a remaining carbon budget 
of less than 10 more years of emissions at their current level.”25  
The observed and forecasted negative effects of climate change are 
externalities that will amplify the longer they are ignored, which has implications 
that BLM should consider during the fossil fuel permitting process.26 In other 
words, there is no time to lose in moving toward net-zero emissions in order to 
achieve a 1.5°C emissions pathway. Along that pathway, every source of GHG 
emissions is significant.  
II. BLM Is Legally Obligated to Address Climate Change, Including in 
Leasing and Permitting 
 FLPMA establishes a standard of care for BLM’s management of federal 
land. BLM must make “judicious use” of federal lands without “permanent 
impairment” to the productivity and quality of the environment.27 BLM “shall, by 
regulation or otherwise, take any action necessary to prevent unnecessary or undue 
degradation of the lands.”28  
 
24 IPCC Summary for Policymakers, supra note 2, at 12, para. C.1. 
25 WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, supra note 4, at 35 (citing Robert McSweeney & Rosamund Pearce, 
Analysis: Just Four Years Left of the 1.5°C Carbon Budget, CARBON BRIEF, Apr. 5, 2017, 
https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-four-years-left-one-point-five-carbon-budget). 
26 See Jayni Foley Hein, Federal Lands and Fossil Fuels: Maximizing Social Welfare in Federal 
Energy Leasing, 42 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 8-23 (2018) (describing externalities of fossil fuel 
development that are unaccounted for in the current leasing structure). 
27 43 U.S.C. §1702(c) (defining “multiple use”). 
28 Id. §1732(b); see also Michael Burger, A Carbon Fee as Mitigation for Fossil Fuel Extraction on 
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Congress requires BLM to manage for a multigenerational investment 
horizon, employing a balance that “will best meet the present and future needs of 
the American people.”29 Congress also identified discrete ecological values that 
should not be permanently impaired. For example, FLPMA’s statement of purpose 
instructs BLM to protect “the quality of scientific, scenic, historical, ecological, 
environmental, air and atmospheric, water resource, and archeological values.”30  
Notably, the list of assets to be stewarded by BLM includes “atmospheric 
values.” Congress understood at least some of the risks and challenges of 
anthropogenic climate change when it used those words. Nine years before FLPMA 
was passed, the Johnson Administration issued a White House report detailing the 
risk of global warming caused by fossil fuel emissions and predicting now familiar 
impacts: melting of the Antarctic ice cap, rising of sea level, and warming of sea 
water.31 When Congress included “atmospheric values” in the list of resources that 
BLM must protect, it had already received evidence that fossil fuel development 
could threaten everything that depends on a safe and stable atmosphere.  
More importantly, Congress understood that there would be multiple, 
unforeseen challenges in striking the right balance of multiple uses. Congress 
defined “multiple use” to include a “combination of balanced and diverse resources 
that takes into account the long-term needs of future generations.”32 This broad 
 
Federal Lands, 42 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 295, 316-26 (2017) (exploring BLM’s statutory duty under 
FLPMA to mitigate climate change impacts). 
29 43 U.S.C. §1702(c) (also requiring a combination of balanced and diverse resource uses “that 
takes into account the long-term needs of future generations”). 
30 Id. §1701(a)(8).  
31 ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION PANEL, PRESIDENT’S SCIENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE, THE WHITE 
HOUSE, RESTORING THE QUALITY OF OUR ENVIRONMENT app. Y4, at 123-26 (1965). 
32 43 U.S.C. §1702(c). 
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language granted BLM regulatory flexibility to respond to new scientific evidence 
and the changing societal needs. As the U.S. Supreme Court recognized when 
interpreting the Clean Air Act, even if the Congress that drafted FLPMA “might 
not have appreciated the possibility that burning fossil fuels could lead to global 
warming, they did understand that without regulatory flexibility, changing 
circumstances and scientific developments would soon render [the Act] obsolete.”33 
Broad language “reflects an intentional effort to confer the flexibility necessary to 
forestall such obsolescence.”34  
Regardless of whether Congress explicitly understood that continued fossil 
fuel development would permanently impair atmospheric values and harm future 
generations, FLPMA’s broad language reflects an intentional effort to confer 
flexibility necessary to respond to changing circumstances and scientific 
developments. Scientific consensus regarding climate change indicates that 
adhering to a 1.5°C carbon budget is necessary to avoid permanent impairment to 
the atmospheric composition and to other natural systems that support civilization, 
and to forestall widespread extinctions. Congress instructed BLM to respond to 
changing circumstances by managing with a multigenerational horizon.35 The 
sweepingly broad language used by Congress in FLPMA grants BLM the 
regulatory flexibility to fulfill its statutory mandate by responding to the new 
circumstances presented by climate change and to alter its oil and gas leasing 
practices to utilize federal resources in a manner “that will best meet the present 
 
33 Massachusetts v. Environmental Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007). 
34 Id. 
35 43 U.S.C. §1702(c) (defining “multiple use” to include “a combination that will best meet the 
present and future needs of the American people” and a combination of uses that “takes into account 
the long-term needs of future generations”). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3668430
** Pre-Print ** 




and future needs of the American people.”36 
III. Unbridled Fossil Fuel Development Violates FLPMA’s Standard of 
Care  
 BLM has acknowledged that increasing GHG emissions may permanently 
impair ecological systems, including the atmosphere.37 In January 2016, BLM 
completed a scoping report on the federal coal leasing program.38 The scoping 
report summarized the scientific consensus, including recent studies that “confirm 
and further strengthen the conclusion that greenhouse gases endanger public 
welfare, and emphasize the urgency of reducing greenhouse gas emissions.”39 BLM 
acknowledged that the atmospheric composition “may be approaching a critical 
climate threshold beyond which rapid and potentially permanent—at least on a 
human timescale—changes . . . may occur.”40 Abrupt and irreversible ecological 
impacts, including species extinctions, “are expected to be exacerbated by climate 
change.”41 Finally, BLM acknowledged that without mitigation, GHG 
concentrations will climb to ever-increasing levels.42  
 
36 Id. 
37 BLM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, FEDERAL COAL PROGRAM: PROGRAMMATIC 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT—SCOPING REPORT 5-46 to 5-50 (2017) [hereinafter BLM, 
FEDERAL COAL PROGRAM PEIS SCOPING REPORT].  
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 5-50.  
40 Id. (quoting NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING EARTH’S DEEP PAST: LESSONS 
FOR OUR CLIMATE FUTURE 2 (2011), available at 
https://www.nap.edu/catalog/13111/understanding-earth’s-deep-past-lessons-for-our-climate-
future).  
41 BLM, FEDERAL COAL PROGRAM PEIS SCOPING REPORT, supra note 38, at 5-51. 
42 Id. at 5-50.  
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These studies illustrate that exacerbating climate change will violate BLM’s 
statutory duty to manage various resources “without permanent impairment of the 
productivity of the land and the quality of the environment.”43 “Crossing a critical 
climate threshold” that compromises atmospheric stability will permanently impair 
the atmospheric values upon which current and future generations depend. 
Similarly, changes resulting in widespread extinction constitute permanent 
impairment because extinction is irreversible. Additionally, widespread extinctions 
damage the productivity of the land because the land cannot produce or rely upon 
extinct species. Exacerbating the risk of these types of harms by allowing increased 
fossil fuel development without mitigating GHG emissions does not meet BLM’s 
statutory duty to establish “coordinated management of the various resources 
without permanent impairment of the productivity of the land and quality of the 
environment.”44  
Despite acknowledging the risks of unabated GHG emissions, BLM 
continues to ignore the massive combined effect of its permitting decisions. BLM 
administers oil and gas leases covering 25.5 million acres and these lands include 
more than 96,000 producible oil and gas wells.45 In producing more than 274 
million barrels of oil, 3.3 billion cubic feet of natural gas, and 302 million tons of 
coal each year,46 the combined effects of BLM’s management decisions 
significantly affect U.S. and global emissions, a fact that BLM has avoided 
 
43 42 U.S.C. §1702(c). 
44 Id. 
45 BLM, U.S. Department of the Interior, Oil and Gas Statistics, 
https://www.blm.gov/programs/energy-and-minerals/oil-and-gas/oil-and-gas-statistics (last visited 
July, 23, 2020).  
46 Office of Natural Resources Revenue, U.S. Department of the Interior, Production Data, 
https://revenuedata.doi.gov/?tab=tab-production (last visited July 23, 2020).  
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BLM’s current approach to oil and gas leasing, which often allows an 
unmitigated increase in GHG emissions, is inconsistent with FLPMA’s mandate to 
avoid permanently impairing ecological values, including the atmosphere. It also 
violates BLM’s duty to manage resources with a multigenerational investment 
horizon. Although agencies have broad discretion in how to respond to climate 
change, that discretion does not extend to whether to address climate change. The 
science of climate change is not a policy preference—it is part of a body of evidence 
that arises in the context of every fossil fuel permitting decision.  
A comprehensive and insightful review of climate-related cases between 
2015 and 2020 published by the nonpartisan Environmental Law Institute reveals 
that “vast judicial agreement exists on the causes, extent, urgency, and 
consequences of climate change.”48 This observation “holds true across U.S. 
federal and state courts, across different types of proceedings, and across 
jurisdictions,” including international jurisdictions.49 The report takes care to point 
out that even the parties, including government agencies like BLM, appeared to 
 
47 See, e.g., Center for Biological Diversity, Petition for a Moratorium on the Leasing of Federal 
Public Land Fossil Fuels Under the Mineral Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 226, 241 Before the U.S. 
Department of the Interior (July 12, 2016), 
https://www.biologicaldiversity.org/campaigns/keep_it_in_the_ground/pdfs/Petition_for_a_Morat
orium_on_the_Leasing_of_Federal_Public_Land_Fossil_Fuels.pdf (submitted on July 12, 2016, 
and still unaddressed or acknowledged); U.S. Climate Change Litigation, Petition for a Moratorium 
on the Leasing of Federal Public Land Fossil Fuels, http://climatecasechart.com/case/petition-for-
a-moratorium-on-the-leasing-of-federal-public-land-fossil-fuels/ (last visited July 23, 2020) 
(providing monthly updates on status of ongoing climate-related proceedings). 
48 MARIA L. BANDA, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, CLIMATE SCIENCE IN THE COURTS: A 
REVIEW OF U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS vi (2020). 
49 Id. 
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agree on basic climate science, even if they disagreed on the legal implications.50 
Where agencies under the Trump Administration are reversing Obama-era policies 
on climate change, courts have reminded the agencies that inconvenient facts 
survive changes of administration. “An agency cannot simply disregard contrary or 
inconvenient factual determinations that it made in the past, any more than it can 
ignore inconvenient facts when it writes on a blank slate.”51 Agency decisions that 
“simply discarded prior factual findings related to climate change” have been found 
arbitrary and capricious.52  
It does not matter that BLM discussed the risks of “crossing a critical 
climate threshold” in the context of coal mining, rather than oil and gas 
development. The same facts apply to any fossil fuel. From tar sands to oil shale to 
oil and gas development, the scientific studies referenced in BLM’s scoping report 
were the preeminent studies reflecting the most current scientific understanding of 
a global problem that is urgent and ubiquitous and caused by a class of fuel. In the 
scoping report, BLM properly recognized that these studies forecast a risk of 
permanent impairment caused by crossing a critical climate threshold. More recent 
studies, like the IPCC special report emphasizing the importance of limiting global 
warming to 1.5°C, further strengthen BLM’s recognition in the scoping report that 
 
50 Id. 
51 Indigenous Envtl. Network v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 347 F. Supp. 3d 561, 584 (D. Mont. 2018), 
rev’d as moot, No. 18-36068 (9th Cir. June 6, 2019). 
52 Id. at 583 (holding that Trump Administration reversal of prior record of decision (ROD) denying 
Keystone XL pipeline was arbitrary and capricious because the new ROD provided no justification 
for the changed decision other than deleting the climate change-related content of the previous 
ROD); see also Defenders of Wildlife v. Jewell, 176 F. Supp. 3d 975, 999 (D. Mont. 2016) (finding 
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service arbitrarily and capriciously ignored climate science in favor of 
political pressures in its decision to reverse prior decision to list wolverine as endangered).  
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exacerbating climate change may cause abrupt and irreversible changes, including 
widespread extinctions.  
A hallmark of administrative law is the requirement that agencies engage in 
“reasoned decisionmaking.”53 As the Supreme Court recently pointed out, “the 
Government should turn square corners in dealing with the people.”54 One of those 
square corners is the requirement to “examine the relevant data and articulate a 
satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between the 
facts found and the choice made.”55 Whether GHG emissions come from coal 
mining or oil and gas development, the relevant data indicate that continuing to 
increase GHG emissions exacerbates the risk of crossing a critical climate threshold 
and causing permanent impairment to the quality of the environment and the 
productivity of the land. Ignoring this relevant data when making permitting 
decisions is arbitrary and capricious.  
IV. Consistent With FLPMA’s Multiple Use Mandate, BLM Should 
Require That All New Fossil Fuel Activity Achieve Net-Zero Emissions 
 BLM has broad authority under FLPMA, the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA), and the Mineral Leasing Act (MLA) to mitigate GHG 
emissions. Until recently, both BLM and the U.S. Department of the Interior 
embraced mitigation measures responding to climate change and landscape-scale 
 
53 Department of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 18-587, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 
3254, at *20 (June 18, 2020) (noting that the procedural requirements of administrative law establish 
the mechanism “by which federal agencies are accountable to the public and their actions subject to 
review”). 
54 Id. at *32. 
55 Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
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management that included landscape-scale mitigation.56 BLM’s current policy 
rejecting compensatory mitigation is inconsistent with precedent, contrary to 
statutory authority, and lacks the force of law.57 Because Trump Administration 
policies represent a policy choice, not a legal boundary of BLM’s authority, they 
should not detract from an informed discussion of BLM’s legal authority to require 
mitigation of GHG emissions. 
Mitigation authority infuses BLM regulations. BLM has regulatory 
authority to make decisions and set standards that avoid impairment of other 
resources, consistent with its duties under FLPMA.58 For example, in combination 
with FLPMA, NEPA requires BLM to consider and, in some cases, implement 
alternatives that mitigate adverse impacts caused by a proposal. Department of the 
Interior regulations implementing NEPA, which apply to BLM, require that every 
proposed action include an analysis “of the effects of the proposed action or 
alternative as well as analysis of the effects of any appropriate mitigation measures 
 
56 See, e.g., Secretarial Order No. 3330, Improving Mitigation Policies and Practices of the 
Department of the Interior (Oct. 31, 2013), revoked by Secretarial Order No. 3349 (Mar. 29, 2017); 
BLM MANUAL MS 1794 MITIGATION (2016), and BLM MITIGATION HANDBOOK H-1794-1 (2016), 
rescinded by Secretarial Order No. 3360 (Dec. 22, 2017); see also ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
TASK FORCE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, A STRATEGY FOR IMPROVING THE MITIGATION 
POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR: A REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF 
THE INTERIOR (2014); JESSICA HALOFSKY ET AL., U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, 
CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION IN UNITED STATES FEDERAL NATURAL RESOURCE SCIENCE AND 
MANAGEMENT AGENCIES: A SYNTHESIS (2015) (describing climate adaptation efforts by federal 
agencies including BLM). 
57 Justin R. Pidot, Compensatory Mitigation and Public Lands, 61 B.C. L. REV. 1046, 1062 (2020); 
Justin R. Pidot, The Bureau of Land Management’s Infirm Compensatory Mitigation Policy, 30 
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2019). 
58 See Mineral Policy Ctr. v. Norton, 292 F. Supp. 2d 30, 42 (D.D.C. 2003) (“FLPMA, by its plain 
terms, vests the Secretary of the Interior with the authority—indeed the obligation—to disapprove 
of an otherwise permissible mining operation because the operation, though necessary for mining, 
would unduly harm or degrade the public land.”). 
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or best management practices that are considered.”59 The MLA also grants BLM 
broad authority to determine what lands to lease, and to manage leases in the public 
interest.60 BLM mineral leasing regulations expressly reserve authority to impose 
“reasonable measures as may be required . . . to minimize adverse impacts.”61 
Specific to onshore oil and gas leases, BLM has regulatory authority “to 
require that all operations be conducted in a manner which protects other natural 
resources and the environmental quality.”62 Emphasizing this authority, oil and gas 
leasing regulations also impose a duty on operators to comply with mitigation-
focused restrictions. Operators must conduct “all operations in a manner . . . [that] 
protects other natural resources and environmental quality; which protects life and 
property.”63 Additionally, operators “shall conduct operations in a manner which 
protects the mineral resources, other natural resources, and environmental 
quality.”64  
In other words, BLM has both options and the authority to act. Many 
statutory and regulatory provisions grant BLM authority to regulate mineral leasing 
operations in a manner that protects environmental quality. Undergirding those 
 
59 43 C.F.R. §46.130(a) (2019). 
60 See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. §226(a) (the secretary “may” lease lands believed to have oil and gas 
deposits); id. §226(b) (the secretary may by regulation establish a higher national minimum bid if 
necessary); id. §226(m) (BLM may require lessees to operate under a reasonable cooperative or unit 
plan; the secretary may prescribe a plan that may alter or modify the rate of prospecting and 
development; the secretary may order communitization and apportionment of leases that cannot be 
appropriately spaced; and the secretary may authorize subsurface storage of oil or gas to promote 
conservation of natural resources); see also Michael Burger & Jessica Wentz, Downstream and 
Upstream Greenhouse Gas Emissions: The Proper Scope of NEPA Review, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 109, 117-19 (2017). 
61 43 C.F.R. §3101.1-2 (2019). 
62 Id. §3161.2. 
63 Id. §3162.1(a). 
64 Id. §3162.5-1(a). 
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regulations, FLPMA requires BLM to manage multiple uses (including mineral 
development) without permanent impairment to the quality of the environment or 
the productivity of the land.65  
BLM has already used this authority to incorporate GHG mitigation 
requirements into best management practices (BMPs) for oil and gas production. 
For example, BLM recently published an environmental assessment related to the 
sale of 283 parcels previously sold in a Wyoming oil and gas lease sale.66 In 
WildEarth Guardians v. Zinke, the federal court for the District of Columbia 
concluded that BLM had sold the parcels without taking a “hard look” at the GHG 
emissions that would result from the sale.67 In its post-remand environmental 
assessment, BLM relied, in part, upon its mitigation authority at the development 
stage to conclude that issuing the leases had no significant environmental impact.68  
Specific to mitigation of impacts from GHG emissions, BLM identified 
three sources of authority for mitigating GHG impacts before an oil and gas well 
received a permit to drill. “Analysis and approval of future development of the lease 
parcels may include application of BMPs within BLM’s authority, as Conditions 
 
65 See supra Parts II and III. 
66 BLM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR 
THE MAY 2015-AUGUST 2016 SOLD AND ISSUED LEASES DOI-BLM-WY-0000-2019-0007-EA 7 
(2019) [hereinafter BLM, EA FOR SOLD WYOMING LEASES], 
https://eplanning.blm.gov/public_projects/nepa/121368/170685/207328/20190412.WYSupplemen
talEA.WEGvZinke.Final.pdf. 
67 368 F. Supp. 3d 41, 85 (D.D.C. 2019). 
68 BLM, EA FOR SOLD WYOMING LEASES, supra note 67, at 26 (explaining that the “sale of parcels 
and issuance of oil and gas leases is an administrative action, without direct impacts to surface 
resources” and subject to further environmental analysis that could avoid adverse impacts by 
imposing mitigation requirements prior to any surface disturbance that would produce 
environmental impacts, including emissions).  
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of Approval (COAs) to reduce or mitigate GHG emissions.”69 BLM also clarified 
that additional GHG mitigation measures could be incorporated as “applicant-
committed measures” or “added to necessary State of Wyoming air quality 
permits.”70 These measures included requiring vapor recovery systems; conversion 
to electric, solar, or mechanical pumps; and use of “green completions” that avoid 
use of open pits and capture gas.71 
Other BLM offices have also identified the possibility of imposing GHG 
mitigation measures as BMPs or as COAs. For example, the Colorado BLM 
published the Comprehensive Air Resource Protection Protocol identifying 
emission mitigation strategies that include GHG emissions.72 These measures also 
include minimizing or eliminating flaring of natural gas and using closed-loop 
systems to capture gas, using electric or renewable energy to power compressors, 
and capture and control of emissions from storage tanks and separation vessels.73 
The protocol further explains that where identified mitigation measures cannot be 
reasonably implemented, BLM may require emission offsets instead.74  
BLM has relied on its authority under both the MLA and FLPMA to require 
mitigation measures.75 In summary, BLM has already implemented procedures and 
reasoning relying on its authority to incorporate GHG mitigation measures at the 
 
69 Id. at 35. 
70 Id.  
71 Id. at 35-36. 
72 COLORADO BLM, COMPREHENSIVE AIR RESOURCE PROTECTION PROTOCOL (CARPP) 15-20 
(2015). 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 11. 
75 Id. at 4-5; BLM, EA FOR SOLD WYOMING LEASES, supra note 67, at 9; see also Waste Prevention, 
Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation, 81 Fed. Reg. 83008, 83019-20 (Nov. 
18, 2016). 
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application for permit to drill (APD) stage. Augmenting these measures to ensure 
that they are evenhandedly enforced and consistent with a carbon budget is also 
within BLM’s authority.  
A. BLM Has Statutory, Regulatory, and Contractual Authority to 
Impose Mitigation Measures at Every Stage of the Process  
 Thousands of oil and gas leases, subject to hundreds of land use plans, are 
already in effect at every stage of the development process. The following 
discussion clarifies that BLM has authority to impose a net-zero requirement at 
each of these stages. This clarification is important for assessing BLM’s authority 
to quickly and evenhandedly implement a net-zero requirement on all new oil and 
gas activity.  
Oil and gas leasing decisions occur in three stages: (1) land use planning; 
(2) leasing; and (3) APD approval. Each stage triggers NEPA, and BLM has 
authority to mitigate adverse environmental impacts at each stage.76  
During stage one, BLM drafts resource management plans (RMPs) 
encompassing vast landscapes.77 BLM must periodically update land use plans,78 
and BLM’s regulations include a duty to revise land use plans based on “new data” 
and “a change in circumstances.”79 The IPCC special report presents “new data” 
 
76 See New Mexico ex rel. Richardson v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 565 F.3d 683, 716 (10th Cir. 2009); 
Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 377 F.3d 1147, 1151 (10th Cir. 2004); Southern Utah 
Wilderness Alliance v. Norton, 457 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1255 (D. Utah 2006).  
77 Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 457 F. Supp. 2d at 1255.  
78 43 U.S.C. §1732(a); id. §1712(a) (BLM must “develop, maintain, and, when appropriate revise 
land plans”); Oregon Nat. Desert Ass’n v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 625 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 
2010). 
79 43 C.F.R. §1610.4-9 (2019); id. §1610.5-6; id. §1610.5-5.  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3668430
** Pre-Print ** 




indicating that climate change is already occurring, that the effects are more 
dramatic than expected, and that this new, observation-based data caution against 
exceeding 1.5°C in global warming. This information constitutes a change in 
circumstances and warrants revising or amending land use plans that authorize 
unmitigated fossil fuel development.  
Using the land use planning process, BLM could adopt a universal 
stipulation or programmatically amend existing land use plans to include a best 
practice that is applicable to all new leases. The lessee’s GHG mitigation strategy 
could be submitted as part of the drilling plan and incorporated as a COA. As BLM 
recognized in its coal program scoping report, a net-zero requirement could be 
achieved by requiring the lessee to carry out (or fund) activities that proportionally 
offset emissions.80 “This approach has been used under the Endangered Species Act 
and Clean Water Act as an efficient way to provide appropriate and measurable 
benefits to a resource that has been negatively affected through a proposed 
action.”81  
For example, lessees could implement methane reduction strategies such as 
plugging abandoned wells sufficient to offset the anticipated CO2 equivalent 
emissions.82 So long as the emission reduction activities are not otherwise required 
by law, a company’s GHG reductions could partially or fully offset the emissions 
from new wells. Alternatively, a lessee could offset emissions through investment 
 
80 BLM, FEDERAL COAL PROGRAM PEIS SCOPING REPORT, supra note 38, at 6-17 (“Alternatively, 
under this option, the BLM could approve transactions proposed by lessees that would achieve the 
desired outcome of compensatory mitigation, but for which projects were carried out by private 
businesses, non-profits, or state or local agencies.”). 
81 Id.  
82 EPA Executive Summary, supra note 22, at ES-8 (abandoned oil and gas wells have steadily 
produced between six and seven million metric tons of CO2e between 1990 and the present). 
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in carbon sink strategies verified by a third party. Although there are still challenges 
to be worked out, a market already exists to utilize third-party providers who verify 
and manage net-zero commitments.83  
The land use planning process has been used in the past to respond to new 
data and changing circumstances. For example, to adopt sage-grouse protections 
across the bird’s range in 10 western states, BLM revised or amended 98 RMPs to 
incorporate mitigation strategies designed to protect habitat.84 To ensure that the 
mitigation measures were implemented consistently, BLM issued an instructional 
memorandum detailing implementation of the procedures designed to incorporate 
mitigation into the leasing and APD processes.85 Using a similar approach would 
require a thorough NEPA assessment that should be accomplished through a 
programmatic environmental impact statement (PEIS). The PEIS should also 
address the other two stages of the leasing process.  
The second stage of the leasing process occurs when BLM offers specific 
parcels of land for sale.86 Leasing decisions usually tier to the RMP while affording 
an opportunity to take a closer look at information not considered at the much 
broader land planning level. At the leasing stage, BLM should conduct a more 
focused NEPA analysis to identify whether site-specific limitations or monitoring 
 
83 See generally Michael A Mehling, Governing Cooperative Approaches Under the Paris 
Agreement, 46 ECOLOGY L.Q. 765 (2019). 
84 See Montana Wildlife Fed’n v. Bernhardt, No. CV-18-69-GF-BMM, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
90571, at *6-8 (D. Mont. May 22, 2020) (discussing Instruction Memorandum No. 2016-143 (Sept. 
1, 2016), which was replaced by later guidance that was invalidated in this decision for not 
accurately reflecting the requirements of the overarching land use plans).  
85 Id.  
86 See Bruce Pendery, BLM’s Retained Rights: How Requiring Environmental Protection Fulfills 
Oil and Gas Lease Obligations, 40 ENVTL. L. 599, 608-09 (2010). 
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and evaluation results require additional mitigation measures as part of an adaptive 
management strategy.87 Even if an RMP allows a particular land use, the site-
specific analysis provides an opportunity to assess whether the assumptions 
supporting the RMP decision remain valid, and whether there are additional or new 
site-specific considerations that may have a significant effect on the environment. 
BLM has authority to impose stipulations at the prepurchase leasing stage, 
including mitigation measures identified during the NEPA process.88 Because the 
lease is a contract, BLM has broad authority to define the terms of the contract prior 
to sale.89  
At the third stage, the lessee submits a site-specific drilling and reclamation 
plan as an APD that BLM must approve. BLM has authority to require mitigation 
at this stage, and it has already acknowledged that this authority includes imposing 
GHG mitigation requirements.90 Consistent with the plain language of the standard 
lease form, the “[l]essee must conduct operations in a manner that minimizes 
adverse impacts to the land, air, and water, to cultural, biological, visual, and other 
resources, and to other land uses or users.”91 BLM retains extensive authority to 
 
87 43 C.F.R. §46.145 (2019) (directing interior bureaus to use “adaptive management” as part of the 
NEPA process, especially “in circumstances where long-term impacts may be uncertain and future 
monitoring will be needed to make adjustments in subsequent implementation decisions”). 
88 Id. §3101.1-3 (“Any party submitting a bid . . . shall be deemed to have agreed to stipulations 
applicable to the specific parcel.”); BLM & U.S. FOREST SERVICE, SURFACE OPERATING 
STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES FOR OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT: THE GOLD 
BOOK §2.3 (4th ed. 2007) (“Constraints may result from lease stipulations, the surface management 
agency’s review and environmental analysis of the proposed operations, Notices to Lessees, 
Onshore Orders, or regulations.”). 
89 Pendery, supra note 87, at 642; Burger, supra note 29, at 319-21. 
90 See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text. 
91 BLM, U.S. Department of the Interior, Form 3100-11, Offer to Lease and Lease for Oil and Gas 
§6 (Oct. 2008) [hereinafter Standard Lease Form 3100-11]; see also 43 C.F.R. §3101.1-2 (2019) 
(clarifying that a lessee’s surface rights are subject to stipulations and “such reasonable measures as 
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require that mitigation measures, best practices, and other “reasonable measures 
deemed necessary” be incorporated into the drilling plan as a condition of APD 
approval.92 Best practices and mitigation measures may be incorporated as part of 
the drilling plan, even if they were not anticipated at the time of the lease sale.93 A 
lessee challenging a requirement included as a COA at the APD stage must prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the mitigation measure was erroneous.94 
Where mitigation measures are based on scientific evidence and environmental 
analysis, BLM’s reasoned opinion is entitled to “considerable deference.”95 Thus, 
BLM has regulatory and contractual authority to impose a net-zero mitigation 
requirement on permits for leases that have already been sold. 
BLM cannot claim that it is “too late” to impose a stringent mitigation 
requirement at the APD stage, because it frequently lauds its extensive authority to 
mitigate environmental impacts at the APD stage.96 BLM and industry have long 
used BLM’s regulatory authority at the APD stage to justify a truncated NEPA 
analysis at the leasing stage, while promising a more detailed analysis of mitigation 
 
may be required by the authorized officer to minimize adverse impacts to other resource values, 
land uses or users not addressed in the lease stipulations at the time operations are proposed”). 
92 Standard Lease Form 3100-11, supra note 92, §6.   
93 Yates Petroleum Inc., 176 I.B.L.A. 144, 154 (2008) (upholding mitigation measures imposed as 
COAs that were more stringent than standards in the RMP).  
94 Id.; see also Grynberg Petroleum, 152 I.B.L.A. 300, 307 (2000) (holding that a lessee challenging 
a remedial requirement imposed as a COA at the plugging and abandonment stage “must show by 
a preponderance of the evidence that such a requirement is excessive”). 
95 Yates Petroleum Inc., 176 I.B.L.A. at 157 (citing authorities). 
96 See, e.g., Duna Vista Resorts, 187 I.B.L.A. 43 (2016) (arguing that it was appropriate to issue a 
finding of no significant impact (FONSI) at the leasing stage because BLM had authority to mitigate 
all potential environmental effects by imposing COAs at the APD stage, including dictating which 
formation the lessee could drill into); see also BLM, EA FOR SOLD WYOMING LEASES, supra note 
67, at 26, 35. 
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measures at the APD phase.97 Especially where analysis has been deferred, it is 
appropriate to use the NEPA process at the APD stage to explore and require 
mitigation opportunities. In a similar context, a federal court in Colorado rejected 
BLM’s claim that it is “too late” to analyze and mitigate GHG emissions after 
having delayed a thorough NEPA analysis at an earlier stage of the leasing process. 
“Under this reasoning, it could theoretically reward agencies for skirting NEPA 
requirements in prior stages of oil and gas development, which does not align with 
the informed decision-making goals of NEPA.”98  
In summary, if BLM and industry justify postponing the NEPA analysis at 
the leasing stage by promising to evaluate mitigation measures at the APD stage, 
then BLM cannot justify foregoing consideration of mitigation measures at the 
APD stage by claiming that it is now too late for that analysis. Thus, for many 
existing leases, BLM could reasonably require lessees to include GHG mitigation 
measures in the drilling plan and require net-zero emissions as a COA at the APD 
stage.  
 
97 See, e.g., San Juan Citizens Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 326 F. Supp. 3d 1227 (D.N.M. 
2018); see also Park County Res. Council Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 817 F.2d 609, 621-22 (10th 
Cir. 1987) (holding that BLM was not required to address potential mitigation measures of lease 
stipulations at the leasing stage because “[i]n order to work the lease, the lessee must submit site-
specific proposals to the Forest Service and BLM who can then modify those plans to address any 
number of environmental considerations” and “each action is subject to continuing review”), 
overruled on other grounds by Village of Los Ranchos de Albuquerque v. Marsh, 956 F.2d 970, 
972 (10th Cir. 1992) (en banc). 
98 Citizens for a Healthy Cmty. v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 377 F. Supp. 3d 1223, 1237 (D. Colo. 
2019) (holding that because downstream emissions were not considered at the leasing stage, the 
“earliest possible time” mandated by NEPA required that they be considered at the master 
development plan stage: “[s]ince it did not happen before, this stage of the development process 
would be the earliest possible time”). 
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B. BLM Can and Should Consistently Impose GHG Mitigation 
Measures Sufficient to Adhere to a Science-Based Carbon 
Budget 
 GHG mitigation requirements should be universally and fairly 
implemented. Developing a complete and equitable implementation strategy will 
take time. BLM has authority to impose a moratorium on oil and gas leasing while 
it develops a comprehensive GHG mitigation policy, so that unmitigated GHG 
emissions do not continue until the new policy and requirements are in place.99 The 
authority to pause onshore oil and gas leasing was discussed in detail in a 2019 
article published by Professor (and former Interior Solicitor) John Leshy, Interior’s 
Authority to Curb Fossil Fuel Leasing, and this Article builds on the well-
developed reasoning set out in that article. The MLA requires that public lands 
“may” be leased.100 While the MLA, as amended by the Federal Onshore Oil and 
Gas Leasing Reform Act of 1987,101 requires that lease sales be held quarterly, this 
requirement applies “where eligible lands are available” for leasing.102 
Accordingly, where the secretary determines that no eligible lands are available for 
sale, he or she is not obligated to hold lease sales.  
As discussed by Professor Leshy, the secretary has historically relied on 
executive authority, withdrawal authority under FLPMA, and land use planning 
 
99 United States ex rel. McLennan v. Wilbur, 283 U.S. 414, 419 (1931) (upholding moratorium on 
oil and gas leasing); John D. Leshy, Interior’s Authority to Curb Fossil Fuel Leasing, 49 ELR 
10631, 10631-32 (July 2019); Burger & Wentz, supra note 61, at 118-19 (discussing statutory and 
precedential authority to impose moratoriums on coal and oil and gas leases). 
100 30 U.S.C. §226(b)(1). 
101 Id. §181 et seq. 
102 Id. §226(b)(1)(A). 
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authority under FLPMA.103 BLM’s authority to impose a moratorium on oil and 
gas leasing ultimately arises from the agency’s overarching duty articulated in 
FLPMA to manage multiple uses without permanent resource impairment.104 
Moreover, the MLA vests BLM with discretion to manage the pace and structure 
of mineral leasing, including suspension of operations in the interest of 
conservation.105 Federal courts have recognized that the phrase “in the interest of 
conservation” used in the MLA includes the prevention of environmental harm.106 
BLM has relied upon these sources of authority to adjust the pace of oil and gas 
leasing in the past.107 
 
103 Leshy, supra note 100, at 2-3. 
104 Other provisions further emphasize this duty. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. §1732(b) (“In managing the 
public lands, the BLM shall, by regulation or otherwise, take any action necessary to prevent 
unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands.”). Courts have recognized that BLM has authority 
to incorporate mitigation measures into project authorizations to prevent unnecessary or undue 
degradation. See, e.g., Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P’ship v. Salazar, 661 F.3d 66, 76, 78 
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (citing with approval Biodiversity Conservation Alliance, 174 I.B.L.A. 1, 5-6 
(2008), which held that an environmental impact may rise to the level of unnecessary or undue 
degradation if it results in “something more than the usual effects anticipated from . . . development, 
subject to appropriate mitigation” (emphasis added)). Since climate change will harm all of the 
resources that BLM manages, incorporating mitigation measures to avoid this degradation is 
required by this affirmative obligation. 
105 See 30 U.S.C. §209 (“In the event the Secretary of the Interior, in the interest of conservation, 
shall direct or shall assent to the suspension of operations and production under any lease granted 
under the terms of this Act . . . .”); 43 C.F.R. §3103.4-4(a) (2019) (“A suspension of all operations 
and production may be directed or consented to by the Authorized Officer only in the interest of 
conservation of natural resources.”); see also Burger & Wentz, supra note 61, nn. 26-27 (listing 
provisions in the MLA that vest BLM with discretion to manage the pace and structure of oil and 
gas leasing); see also Leshy, supra note 100, at 10631-32 (challenging Secretary Bernhardt’s 
suggestion that BLM lacks authority to impose a moratorium by reviewing the discretionary 
language in 30 U.S.C. §226(a) combined with precedent upholding a moratorium and subsequent 
legislative history of the MLA). 
106 Copper Valley Mach. Works, Inc. v. Andrus, 653 F.2d 595, 602 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Hoyl v. Babbitt, 
129 F.3d 1377, 1380 (10th Cir. 1997). 
107 See Instruction Memorandum No. 2016-143, Implementation of Greater Sage-Grouse Resource 
Management Plan Revisions or Amendments—Oil & Gas Leasing and Development Sequential 
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Imposing a moratorium on new leasing will provide an opportunity for 
BLM to assess the existing inventory of leased lands and determine how to address 
future development, including GHG mitigation.108 It will also provide BLM an 
opportunity to reconsider how to allow development of oil and gas leases “without 
permanent impairment of the productivity of the land and the quality of the 
environment” consistent with BLM’s statutory mandate.109 
Regarding leases that have already been sold but not yet put into production, 
BLM should conduct a thorough environmental assessment to determine whether 
the cumulative effect of issuing drilling permits for the existing inventory of 
nonproducing leases (14,119 leases representing 12,757,922 acres)110 will have a 
significant impact on the environment.111, 112 The analysis could be included in the 
 
Prioritization 7 n.10 (Sept. 1, 2016). 
108 See Secretarial Order No. 3338, Discretionary Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement 
to Modernize the Federal Coal Program (Jan. 15, 2016) (justifying a pause on the issuance of new 
federal coal leases to avoid “locking in for decades the future development of large quantities of 
coal under current rates and terms that the PEIS may ultimately determine to be less than optimal”). 
109 43 U.S.C. §1702(c). 
110 BLM, supra note 46. Comparing information from Tables 1, 2, 5, and 6 reveals that in 2018, 
there were 38,147 leased parcels (representing 25,552,475 acres) but only 24,028 producing leases 
(representing 12,794,553 acres). The difference is 14,119 leases (representing 12,757,922 acres) 
that have not been put into production. 
111 40 C.F.R. § 1501.5(a) (2020) (“  40 C.F.R. §1501.5(a) (2020) (“An agency shall prepare an 
environmental assessment . . . when the significance of the effects is unknown unless the agency 
finds that a categorical exclusion (§ 1501.4) is applicable or has decided to prepare an environmental 
impact statement.”)..”). 
112 Recent amendments to NEPA’s implementing regulations eliminate the term “cumulative 
effect.” We strongly caution against reading the new regulations as eliminating the need for a 
cumulative effects analysis because federal courts consistently hold that the Act requires an 
assessment of cumulative effects, and these cases predate regulations codifying and then defining 
away cumulative effects. See generally, Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79 (2d Cir., 
1975) (requiring a cumulative effects analysis for dredging the Thames River), see also Jones v. 
Lynn, 477 F.2d 885, 891 (1st Cir. 1973) (requiring a cumulative effects analysis), and Swain v. 
Brinegar, 517 F.2d 766, 775 (7th Cir. 1975) (same). The CEQ’s new regulations can refine 
regulations but they cannot eliminate a requirement that emanates from the Act itself, which courts 
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PEIS or conducted independently. BLM could also use the NEPA process to 
evaluate whether mitigating GHG emissions through offsets would be a 
“reasonable measure” necessary to “minimize adverse impacts to land, air, and 
water, to cultural, biological, visual, and other resources, and to other land uses or 
users.”113  
If the NEPA process determines that it is a “reasonable measure” in light of 
the risks of exacerbating climate change, then BLM could require a net-zero plan 
from all lessees at the APD stage. Lessees who desired to proceed before BLM can 
complete a cumulative effects analysis for all sold but not yet producing leases and 
could agree to voluntarily mitigate GHG emissions.114 Assuming that there are no 
other significant environmental impacts, committing to achieve net-zero emissions 
could justify a mitigated finding of no significant impact (FONSI), with respect to 
GHG emissions, and the approval of the pending APD prior to the completion of a 
cumulative effects analysis for similarly situated leases or prior to the completion 
of the PEIS.  
Thus, the existing regulatory structure, combined with the reasoned 
 
from multiple circuits were interpreting in the aforementioned cases. The new regulations also do 
not prevent consideration of cumulative effects, and any NEPA process that ignores cumulative 
effects will likely face swift legal challenge. 
113 Standard Lease Form 3100-11, supra note 92, §6; see also 43 C.F.R. §3101.1-2 (2019) (clarifying 
that a lessee’s surface rights are subject to stipulations and “such reasonable measures as may be 
required by the authorized officer to minimize adverse impacts to other resource values, land uses 
or users not addressed in the lease stipulations at the time operations are proposed”). 
114 See Spiller v. White, 352 F.3d 235, 241 (5th Cir. 2003) (listing circuits that endorse the practice 
of mitigated FONSIs and explaining: “This situation occurs when an agency or involved third party 
agrees to employ certain mitigation measures that will lower the otherwise significant impacts of an 
activity on the environment to a level of insignificance. In this way, a FONSI could be issued for an 
activity that otherwise would require the preparation of a full-blown EIS.”). Notably, the CEQ’s 
2020 NEPA regulations continue to recognize mitigated FONSIs.  40 C.F.R. § 1501.6(c). 
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decisionmaking process imposed by NEPA, provides BLM with authority and 
opportunity to require mitigation of adverse environmental effects caused by oil 
and gas operations. Because exacerbating climate change is an adverse effect 
caused by the combined effect of oil and gas operations that increase national GHG 
emissions, BLM should use its existing authority to require that all new oil and gas 
activity incorporate GHG mitigation strategies in drilling plans. BLM could 
reasonably include a net-zero emission strategy as a COA for all new oil and gas 
wells. 
V. Conclusion 
 The world has a finite carbon budget that is being depleted while the United 
States fails to act forcefully. Failure to stay within the carbon budget will exacerbate 
climate change and result in “permanent impairment of the productivity of the land 
and quality of the environment.” Entrusted with managing the nation’s mineral 
estate, BLM sits at the crossroads of this transition. Continuing to authorize fossil 
fuel development without requiring GHG mitigation will exacerbate climate 
change and violate BLM’s statutory mandate. 
BLM has regulatory authority over the oil and gas leasing and development 
process. Oil and gas regulations reflect BLM’s statutory duty to mitigate adverse 
effects on other resources and other land users. In light of the risks posed by 
exacerbating climate change, mitigating the increase in GHG emissions associated 
with expanded oil and gas development is reasonable and justified. Within the 
existing legal framework, BLM has authority to impose mitigation measures at 
every stage of the oil and gas leasing process. Thus, BLM could incorporate a net-
zero requirement on all new leases, as well as leases that have been sold, but have 
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not yet applied for an APD.  
To fulfill its multiple use mandate, BLM should use this authority, 
combined with the NEPA process, to incorporate GHG mitigation measures as part 
of the oil and gas leasing and development process. BLM should require that all 
new oil and gas development activity incorporates GHG mitigation strategies 
sufficient to achieve net-zero emissions.  
To ensure consistent implementation, and to comply with NEPA, BLM 
could impose a moratorium on oil and gas leasing until the completion of a PEIS. 
To determine whether leases that have been sold but have not obtained an APD 
should be included in the PEIS, BLM could conduct an environmental assessment 
to determine whether the effect of issuing APDs to all similarly situated, 
nonproducing leases would have a significant environmental effect. Lessees could 
avoid waiting for the results of the environmental assessment and potential EIS by 
voluntarily agreeing to mitigate GHG emissions in order to obtain a mitigated 
FONSI (assuming that there were no other significant impacts). This approach 
would be consistent with BLM’s statutory duty to manage federal lands according 
to a standard of care, with a multigeneration time horizon, and without permanent 
impairment of the nation’s ecological resources, including the atmosphere.  
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